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I. Introduction to MDG-Oriented Macroeconomic Policies
At the Gleneagles summit in 2005, the G-8 committed to doubling Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa by 2010 in order to help finance
national efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Will such a substantial scaling-up of ODA lead to more expansionary
macroeconomic policies? This Policy Research Brief assesses the
implications for fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies.
Despite a recent upsurge of export-driven growth in sub-Saharan Africa,
macroeconomic policies remain focused on maintaining macroeconomic
stability. The prevailing neoliberal economic model relies on market forces
to drive development. This implies fiscal policies preoccupied with small
deficits, monetary policies fixated on low inflation targets and
exchange-rate policies committed to full flexibility.
Such policies are unlikely to accelerate growth and broaden its impact
to the extent necessary to halve extreme income poverty by 2015
(i.e., achieve MDG #1) and support the attainment of the other MDG
targets for human development. So, is there an alternative
economic model that could be successful?
This Policy Research Brief advances an alternative that entails three major changes in macroeconomic frameworks: 1) fiscal policies
should become more expansionary—focusing on expanding public investment—and more intent on raising domestic revenue;
2) the exchange rate should be managed in order to promote export competitiveness and currency stability; and 3) monetary policy
should accommodate fiscal expansion and export promotion, achieving low real rates of interest that promote private investment and
alleviate public-sector debt.
Because policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa have operated under the binding constraints of a neoliberal economic model, the region’s
growth performance still lags behind the rates necessary to attain the MDGs, despite fortuitous external factors. Figure 1 (next page)
illustrates the growth performance during 1985-2005 for three groupings of countries in the region: conflict-affected countries
(10 countries), non-conflict middle-income countries (7) and non-conflict low-income countries (24).
The recovery of conflict-affected countries since the mid-1990s has led to the misleading impression of significant improvement
in the whole region. However, middle-income countries have been doing worse during this period and improvements in low-income
countries have been only modest.
For the low-income group of 24 countries, growth of income per person averaged a mere 0.2 per cent during the 1990s and rose to




Conditionalities imposed by stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes have compelled governments to try to achieve very
low fiscal deficits, as well as low inflation rates. So, rarely have fiscal policies been growth-conducive (see Weeks and Patel 2007).
The obsession with low deficits has been misaligned with the fiscal conditions prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa. Evidence for 30
countries for which the IMF reports relevant statistics shows that large fiscal deficits (i.e., over five per cent of GDP) have not been
widespread. Over the period 1985-2005, never more than one fourth of these countries had a larger deficit at any one time. In all years
during this period, at least half the countries had a deficit below three per cent.
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Figure 1
Annual Growth Rates for Sub-Saharan African Countries
by Category, 1985-2005
Notes: Conflict countries are Angola, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators 2006, and
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/weoselgr.aspx>.
What is the purpose of running deficits? One is to compensate
for economic downturns. The movements of both revenues
and expenditures are tied to the economic cycle: revenues fall
when private income falls but social expenditures need to rise
in order to compensate for income losses. Thus, insisting
inflexibly on maintaining low deficit targets renders fiscal
policy ‘pro-cyclical’ (i.e., government spending falls when
private incomes drop). This makes downturns worse.
Running deficits has a more development-relevant objective:
borrowing to finance public investment in essential economic
and social infrastructure. Without extensive public investment,
attainment of the Millennium Development Goals would not
be possible. Widening deficits for such a purpose should be,
in fact, a regular fiscal practice, and largely funded, over the
medium term, by concessional external finance.
But governments should concentrate, over the longer term, on
mobilizing more domestic revenue for financing development,
instead of resorting to domestic or external debt. Even relying
indefinitely on external grants has drawbacks since it could
dampen incentives to raise domestic resources.
Recent efforts to raise revenue have been anaemic. From the
early 1990s to the early 2000s, revenue as a ratio to GDP has
risen only from 14.1 per cent to 15.9 per cent in low-income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (McKinley 2007a and 2007b).
A doubling of such an increase, i.e., to four percentage points of
GDP over 10 years, is needed to begin graduating governments
from reliance on Official Development Assistance for financing
MDG-focused public investment. In order to achieve such a
target, governments will need to adopt a more ambitious,
diversified approach to mobilizing domestic resources, relying
pragmatically on all major sources of revenue, i.e., domestic
indirect taxes, direct taxes and trade taxes.
III. Exchange Rate Policy:
Managing for International Competitiveness
While stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes
were rendering fiscal policies passive and deficit-phobic,
they were also converting a previously active management
of the exchange rate into a non-interventionist, laissez-faire
regime. The justification was that governments in the sub-
Saharan region were supporting over-valued exchange rates.
But the effects of such neoliberal reforms have been counter-
productive. Contrary to expectations, non-intervention has led to
increased volatility of nominal exchange rates, often precipitated
by transitory external ‘shocks’, such as international price changes
or manipulation by large traders in narrow currency markets (see
Weeks et al. 2007). Moreover, a substantial proportion of foreign
exchange flows in and out of sub-Saharan Africa—namely, Official
Development Assistance and remittances—tend to be
unresponsive to exchange-rate movements.
In the small open economies prevalent in the region, exchange-
rate volatility has gravely jeopardized macroeconomic stability.
It was the prevalence of such market dysfunctions before the
1980s that motivated, in fact, the original adoption of exchange
rate management.
As the prices of some primary products, especially petroleum
and minerals, have risen in the 2000s, exchange rates have
appreciated in some countries. Under such conditions,
exchange-rate management becomes critical, particularly
in order to foster the international competitiveness of non-
primary exports, such as manufactures.
Avoid Inflation Targeting
But inflation-targeting monetary policies make such
management exceedingly difficult. IMF conditionalities have
often placed restrictions on money-supply growth. If central
banks purchase foreign exchange (and correspondingly sell
domestic currency) in order to counteract currency
appreciation, the domestic money supply will grow.
In response, central banks often sell government securities
(‘sterilize’) in order to mop up liquidity. But sterilization ends up
cancelling the potentially positive effect of the original infusion
of domestic currency. Frequently, domestic interest rates rise.
In some cases, portfolio inflows surge into the economy to
speculate on the currency appreciation, particularly if it is
driven by a commodity boom. This only exacerbates the
pressures for appreciation. Open capital accounts (which have
commonly accompanied a laissez-faire exchange-rate regime)
heighten such volatility.
While exchange-rate management is inconsistent with inflation
targeting, it is complementary to monetary policies that
accommodate expansionary, investment-focused fiscal policies.
Exchange-rate management can neutralize inflationary
pressures arising from rising investment demand or terms-of-
trade shocks. An example of a terms-of-trade shock is a jump in
oil prices for an oil-importing developing country.
In general, exchange-rate management is essential for:
1) maintaining short-term stability of the nominal exchange
rate, which can reduce private-sector uncertainty and facilitate
public-sector budget planning; and 2) achieving a real exchange
rate in the medium term that can foster broad-based export
competitiveness and structural diversification of the economy.
Achieving the first objective is extremely important in
sub-Saharan Africa because of the lack of private-sector
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Figure  2
Inflation Rates for Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1983-2006
Notes: See endnotes number 2.
Source: IMF. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/
weoselgr.aspx>.
practice, only large enterprises can afford to hedge effectively,
typically through foreign financial intermediaries. So, regular
short-term central bank intervention to manage exchange-rate
risk could spread the social benefits more broadly, particularly
among medium and small enterprises.
Achieving the second objective, competitiveness, is a strategic
priority, particularly for countries with a high export
concentration but low export diversification. These features
characterize many low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Managing the exchange rate should strive for a real rate that is
not only relatively stable but also, if possible, slightly undervalued
in order to favour tradable goods, both exports and import
substitutes. This would help hasten the diversification of the
economy and progressively boost overall productivity.
IV. Monetary Policy:
Supporting Fiscal Expansion
The policy of the orthodox framework that is perhaps most
detrimental to expanding investment to achieve the MDGs is
‘inflation targeting’. In its most inflexible form, it mandates the
central bank to target an inflation rate below a low threshold.
Until recently, that level was often five per cent or below.
The instrument deployed to ‘hit’ the target has almost always
been the nominal interest rate. In practice, fulfilling such
a mandate has overridden all other policy objectives,
whether they be growth, employment or export promotion.
Since this framework assumes that every economy gravitates
towards general equilibrium, it believes that inflation has no
structural cause. It is usually assumed to arise from extraneous
factors, such as ‘random shocks’ or people’s expectations.
Ultimately, the government is blamed—usually because of
excessive spending—for fuelling continuous expectations
of rising inflation.
Strict inflation targeting is bound to fail in sub-Saharan Africa
because of large, unpredictable swings in prices. For
illustration purposes, assume an inflation target of five per
cent. During 1980-2000, the average annual terms-of-trade
shock across 42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa was 4.5 per
cent of GDP, with a large standard deviation of 5.4. Since the
average economy in the region has a trade sector (combining
export and import shares) that is one-third of GDP, the likely
result is to produce, half the time, an external price ‘shock’ of
1.5 per cent (1/3 of 4.5).
This implies that yearly economy-wide price changes due
to non-tradables would have to be confined, at least, to only
3.5 per cent (5.0 – 1.5) in order for inflation to stay, half the
time, under an overall five per cent threshold. But since
the standard deviation (5.4) for the external price shock is
so large, the target for the price effect of non-tradables
would have to be set much lower than 3.5 per cent.
Since labour is a large input into non-tradables, real wage
increases would also have to be contained. This would lead
to a policy bias towards maintaining high nominal interest
rates in order to contain the aggregate demand pressures
that could fuel inflation.
But inflation has not, in fact, been a grave problem in sub-
Saharan Africa. The calculations for Figure 2 divide countries in
the region into three groups: three hyper-inflation countries
(Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and, in the 2000s,
Zimbabwe (which are excluded from the figure)), six inflation-
prone countries, and 29 countries with only moderate inflation.
Since 29 countries have had an inflation rate of less than
10 per cent two-thirds of the time and have maintained
a long-run average of less than eight per cent, restrictive
monetary policies obsessed with price stability do not appear
justified. There is little convincing evidence, in fact, that
moderate inflation, i.e., 5-15 per cent (if not higher), retards
growth. If inflation becomes a problem because of adverse
supply shocks (such as rising food or oil prices), domestic
measures, such as maintaining food buffer stocks or
subsidizing public transportation, could mitigate its impact.
Moreover, there was a convergence of inflation in the six high-
inflation countries to the level of the moderate-inflation countries
by 1999. This convergence across countries of different sizes,
economic structures and past performances suggests that
underlying inflationary pressures have declined in recent years
for the entire region.
The continuing misguided effort to maintain low inflation rates
is reflected in the trends in real rates of interest depicted in
Figure 3. Shown for 1985-2005 are the percentage of countries
with real interest rates exceeding six per cent, the percentage
with real rates ranging between zero and six per cent, and the
percentage with negative real rates.
Figure  3
Real Interest Rates: Percentage of Countries by Range,
1985-2005
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A six per cent real rate of interest is a high-end estimate for the
so-called ‘Golden Rule’. This states that the long-term real rate
of interest should not exceed the maximum sustainable rate of
growth of real income per capita. If the interest rate did exceed
such a threshold, it would hamper growth.
For the first ten years of the entire period 1985-2005, about half
of the countries had real interest rates above the ‘Golden Rule’
level. After 1997, the average was 80 per cent. This signified that
four out of five countries had real interest rates that likely
constrained economic growth.
Furthermore, negative interest rates, which had been heavily
criticised in the orthodox adjustment literature, were
overwhelmingly a problem of only a few conflict-affected, hyper-
inflation countries. For example, for the 23 instances of negative
real interest rates during 1997-2003, 18 were confined to the
three countries of Angola, DRC and Zimbabwe.
If monetary policy were liberated from the straight-jacket of
inflation targeting, it could contribute to the accelerated growth
and human development necessary to attain the MDGs. Its main
contribution should be to support expansionary fiscal policy. If
inflationary pressures are moderate, this support would generally
take the form of promoting positive but low real interest rates
and ensuring an adequate expansion of the money supply.
A major obstacle to effectively implementing MDG-based
macroeconomic policies is the underdevelopment of financial
institutions and, in some cases, the low monetization of the
economy in sub-Saharan Africa. This helps explain why
governments have difficulties in selling securities to the domestic
financial sector. Because they often have to pay high real rates of
interest, their debt burdens are worsened. Even when real rates
of interest have started to decline, the spread between deposit
and lending rates of interest have frequently remained wide. In a
forthcoming companion Policy Research Brief on MDG-oriented
financial policies, we will examine such issues.
V. Concluding Remarks
A macroeconomic framework oriented towards achieving the
MDGs does not have to be discovered: it is known and it is
feasible. Fiscal policy should be expansionary and focused
on financing wide-ranging public investment; exchange rates
should be managed in order to maintain short-run price and
currency stability and foster long-term competitiveness and
diversification of the economy; and monetary policy should
accommodate fiscal expansion instead of restricting it through
the targeting of unreasonably low inflation rates and
correspondingly high real rates of interest.
Such a framework would allow macroeconomic policies
to be aligned with a national MDG-based strategy focused
on accelerating investment, economic growth and human
development. Over the longer term, such an orientation would
also imply a greater reliance on mobilizing domestic development
finance instead of banking indefinitely on Official Development
Assistance, which has often been unreliable, if not volatile.
In recent years, as net ODA has begun to rise, there has been a
greater emphasis on policy coordination—particularly between
fiscal policies and monetary policies but also between these two
and exchange-rate policies. However, restrictive inflation-focused
monetary policies have held sway over the other two.
The terms of such coordination have to be transformed in
order to be consistent with an MDG orientation. Monetary
policies have to be tailored to accommodate fiscal expansion,
fostering, in particular, affordable public investment. They also
have to support exchange-rate management for export
competitiveness instead of undermining it by rigidly targeting
low inflation rates.  
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2. High Inflation (6) – Countries with an average inflation over 30 per cent for
the entire period (Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and
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